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Introduction  
Accelerated growth in agriculture is seen by many as 
critical if the MDGs are to be met in Africa. Although 
there are debates about the future viability of small farms 
(Hazell et al. 2007), the official policies of many national 
governments and international development agencies 
accord a central role to the intensification and commer-
cialisation of smallholder agriculture as a means of 
achieving poverty reduction. According to this thinking, 
smallholder agriculture is uniquely positioned to deliver 
broad-based growth in rural areas (where the vast 
majority of the world’s poor still live). However, others 
fear that strategies for commercialising agriculture will 
not bring benefits to the majority of rural households, 
either directly or (in the view of some) at all. Instead, they 
fear that efforts to promote a more commercial agricul-
ture will benefit primarily large-scale farms. At best, the 
top minority of smallholders will be able to benefit.  
In this paper, therefore, we discuss what is meant by 
the commercialisation of agriculture, emphasising the 
different pathways that commercialisation can take. We 
also examine what needs to be done if agricultural 
commercialisation is to be inclusive, bringing benefits 
to a large proportion of rural households.  The potential 
benefits of commercialisation and engaging in trade are 
well documented. These include stimulating rural growth, 
which poor people can gain from directly, for example 
through: improving employment opportunities 
(depending on the labour intensity of crops grown); 
increasing agricultural labour productivity; direct income 
benefits for employees and employers; expanding food 
supply and potentially improving nutritional status. 
Multiplier effects encompass increased demand for food 
and services in the local area (von Braun and Kennedy, 
1994).1
But what does commercialisation mean?  What does 
it mean to be commercialised? What kinds of commer-
cialisation are good for the poor? Conversely, under what 
circumstances are poor people likely to be bypassed in 
favour of larger farmers and unable to take advantage 
of new opportunities? Governments have clear ideas of 
what they would like to achieve in creating and supporting 
a thriving agricultural sector, not least in the name of 
enabling agriculture-based economic growth. But do 
these programmes have the right focus in terms of 
poverty reduction? What informs them and what are the 
implications? Are appropriate mechanisms in place for 
effective implementation, including the right enabling 
environment and adequate and timely service delivery? 
What are the policy processes behind a successful pro-
smallholder commercialisation policy? 
This paper aims to engage in alternative perspectives 
of agricultural commercialisation to shift thinking and 
ways of framing the debates, arguing for a diverse range 
of commercialisations, locally specific trajectories, and 
differentiated engagement with domestic and export 
markets. The overarching question here is how to trans-
late pro-smallholder commercialisations policy into 
practice. Growth–poverty reduction linkages for small-
holder farmers through commercialised agriculture do 
not lie along just one or two channels. Indirect (or multi-
plier) effects are also key, especially those through labour 
markets.2 Focusing on crops, the paper attempts to get 
away from the idea that there is one, ideal commercial 
agriculture, following a linear path to some clearly 
defined end point.3 Hence the plural: commercialisations. 
This also allows for concepts of commercial agriculture 
that go beyond simple distinctions often made, such as 
those between ‘food’ and ‘cash’ crops.  
Drawing on existing literature, the paper sets out a 
framework for describing the different kinds of commer-
cialisation that co-exist. It attempts also to give a sense 
of what might be emerging in relation to this framework, 
the diverse forms of commercialisation that respond to 
distinct livelihood needs and local contexts. This allows 
a time dimension, dynamics and future scenarios, and 
moves away from any presumption of a singular type of 
transition to a particular type of ‘commercial’ agriculture. 
This framework can be used to pose questions for empir-
ical studies and to examine potential implications of 
different policy options, in terms of implementation as 
well as outcomes. 
What are 
commercialisations? 
Policy discourses around agricultural commercialisations 
tend to separate producers into different types of farm 
(small farms, large farms) growing different types of crops 
(food crops, cash crops) with simple distinctions made 
between ‘subsistence’ and ‘commercial’ or  ‘export’ agri-
culture. Lack of clarity about what commercialisation 
actually means may give rise to misconceptions, evoking 
certain fears that can obstruct the passage of policy into 
practice. Work by the Future Agricultures Consortium in 
Ethiopia has identified fears that commercialisation 
means, among other things:4
A focus on non-food crops  •
Squeezing out the smallholder farmer  •
Expropriation of land, displacement  •
Dispossession of peasants  •
Increased food insecurity  •
Capitalism  •
Mechanisation, modernisation  •
Capital intensity, rather than labour intensity  •
 In other words, there is a fear that commercialisation 
essentially means promoting change that is in the inter-
ests of larger, more powerful players to the detriment of 
smallholder farmers. 
Defining commercialisation  
Production for market 
Writings on commercialisation highlight a number of 
aspects of what it means to be commercialised. However, 
the lynchpin of most, if not all, definitions of agricultural 
commercialisation is the degree of participation in the 
(output) market, with the focus very much on cash 
incomes5. One dictionary definition gives a spatial dimen-
sion, describing commercial agriculture as “the growing 
of crops for sale outside the community” (Encyclopaedia, 
Colombia University Press). The first question is whether 
a farm or household sells any of its crop output. After 
this, some studies consider the degree of commercialisa-
tion in terms of amount of crops sales (volume, income). 
Thus, for example, Integrated Rural Development 
Program (IRDP) studies in Northern Province, Zambia 
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define commercialised farmers as those who sell more 
than 30 bags of maize per annum (Sugiyama, 1987; 
Kakeya and Sugiyama, 1987). However, a better approach 
is to consider the percentage of crop production marketed 
by a farm or household. Thus, Strasberg et al.(1999) 
suggest the following simple household crop commer-
cialisation index (CCI): 
CCI=(gross value of all crop sales/gross value of all 
crop production)x100. 
While there are computational difficulties, we note 
that there is no reason in principle why this should not 
be extended to include livestock (on both the numerator 
and denominator). However, we do not pursue this idea 
further here. A value of zero for the CCI signifies total 
subsistence, while a CCI value approaching 100 indicates 
higher degrees of commercialisation i.e. a greater 
percentage of crop production marketed. A big advan-
tage of this approach is that commercialisation is treated 
as a continuum, thereby avoiding crude distinctions 
between “commercialised” and “non-commercialised” 
farms. 
This simple index is open to criticism. One possible 
criticism is that it makes no meaningful distinction 
between a farmer who produces just one bag of maize 
and sells that one bag, and one growing fifty bags of 
maize who sells thirty of them. On the basis of the CCI, 
the first farmer, with a CCI of 100, would appear to be 
more commercialised than the second, who has a CCI of 
60. There is some validity to this criticism, as this carica-
tured example shows. However, for reasons that will 
become clearer below, in practice there are few tiny farms 
that sell all of their output (at least, at lower levels of 
economic development) and similarly few large farms 
that do not sell most of theirs.  
A related criticism concerns “distress” sales, i.e. crop 
sales by poor households straight after harvest because 
they are desperate for cash. Where it is food that is being 
sold, the household may then be forced to buy back the 
same (or indeed a greater) quantity of food later in the 
year when the price is much higher. In this case, the crop 
sale raises the CCI, but is in no way indicative of increasing 
household welfare. Survey evidence suggests that 10–15 
per cent of southern and eastern African rural households 
are both net food deficit (over the course of a typical 
year) and, nevertheless, sell a proportion of their food 
output soon after harvest (Jayne et al. 2006, Poulton et 
al. 2006b). This shows that there is some substance to 
this criticism and that interpretation of any empirical 
results based on the CCI needs to take the phenomenon 
of “distress” sales into account. 
What the CCI does, very effectively, is to bring subsis-
tence food production to the centre of discussions about 
commercialisation. CCI falls below 100 to the extent that 
households devote their land, labour and capital 
resources to the production of food for own consump-
tion, rather than to the production of crops (food or 
otherwise) for sale to the market. We discuss the reasons 
for the persistence of subsistence food production in 
more detail later in the paper. Even at this early stage, 
however, it is worth making the point that strategies for 
agricultural commercialisation should start by seeking 
to understand why households produce food for own 
consumption and then create the conditions that will 
help them over time to devote less of their resources to 
this activity. This can be achieved either by increasing 
the efficiency of the markets from which they might buy 
food and/or by assisting them to grow their own food 
more efficiently if they wish to do so. 
A d d i t i o n a l  d i m e n s i o n s  t o  a g r i c u l t u r a l 
commercialisation 
While the degree of participation in the output market 
lies at the heart of most definitions of agricultural 
commercialisation, some literature does address other 
dimensions of commercialisation (see, for example, the 
discussion in von Braun and Kennedy (1994)). Here, we 
briefly note three additional dimensions. 
First, there is the degree of participation in input 
markets. As farms become more commercial, they tend 
to rely less on own-produced inputs (e.g. manure, 
retained seed) and services from mixed farming systems 
(e.g. animal traction) and instead depend more on 
markets to supply their inputs (improved seed, inorganic 
fertiliser, crop protection chemicals) and services (mecha-
nised equipment for ploughing, planting, weeding, 
harvesting etc – either hired/rented or purchased). Thus, 
on the input side we might define commercialisation 
as:  
ICI = value of inputs acquired from market/ agricultural 
production value 
As is well illustrated by Pingali (1997), commercialisa-
tion on the input side is likely to be driven over time by 
rising opportunity costs of both labour and land. It is 
also likely to proceed in tandem with the degree of 
participation in output markets. We, therefore, do not 
consider this dimension further in this paper. 
Second, it is observed that, as farms become more 
commercialised, they rely increasingly on hired labour, 
with family labour focusing more on supervisory and 
managerial tasks. This may be linked to the opening up 
of other opportunities for the family’s labour elsewhere 
in the economy. As farm production becomes increas-
ingly business-oriented, rather than a matter of survival, 
some family members may choose to work in other occu-
pations, with the remaining members hiring in workers 
to accomplish the necessary tasks. Alternatively, where 
commercialisation is associated with farm consolidation 
(see below), additional hired labour may be required to 
cope with an expanding cultivated area. Note, however, 
that where farm consolidation is driven by rising real 
wages elsewhere in the economy, this will also encourage 
mechanisation (Pingali 1997), such that the increase in 
total labour input into the farm is limited.  
An interesting case of reliance on hired labour at an 
early stage of agricultural development is provided by 
the top smallholder cotton producers in Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe. These devote half to two-thirds of their land 
to cotton production and typically rely heavily on hired 
labour for most tasks related to cotton cultivation. Family 
labour thus has primarily a managerial role in cotton. 
However, family labour represents the dominant labour 
input into the household food production activities, 
which occupies most of the remaining land on the 
farm. 
In this case, the total area of land cultivated is too great 
for the household alone to supply labour. At the same 
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time, attractive off-farm opportunities for family labour 
are limited, so family labour is still supplied on the farm. 
The distribution of this labour between crops reflects 
intra-household decision making and division of labour 
arrangements, but also again highlights the significance 
of subsistence food production within agricultural 
commercialisation processes.
So far we have considered labour hire as an indicator 
of commercialisation. However, another strand in the 
literature sees the form of labour used (family vs hired) 
as an important determinant of comparative advantage 
in crop production. We return to this in section 4. Third, 
some writing on commercialisation highlights the impor-
tance attached to the profit motive within the farm busi-
ness as an indicator of commercialisation. Thus, Pingali 
and Rosegrant (1995: 171) state that: 
Agricultural commercialization means more than 
the marketing of agricultural output, it means the 
product choice and input use decisions are based 
on the principles of profit maximisation. Commercial 
reorientation of agriculture occurs for the primary 
staple cereals as well as for the so-called high value 
cash crops. On the input side, commercialization 
implies that both traded and non-traded inputs are 
valued in terms of their market value.” 
This is a useful nuance within discussions on commer-
cialisation. As will be discussed below, risk minimisation, 
rather than profit maximisation, is an important driver 
of subsistence production. The phenomenon of “distress” 
sales, discussed above, provides a good example of sale 
of crops that is not driven by a profit motive, but rather 
a short-term survival need. Decisions to supply labour 
off-farm can also have both “push” and “pull” motivations 
(see below).   
B r o a d e r  ( h o u s e h o l d - l e ve l )  c o n c e p t s  o f 
commercialisation 
Looking beyond purely the agricultural activities of a 
household, von Braun and Kennedy (1994) propose a 
measure of integration into the cash economy (ICE), 
which they define as: 
ICE = value of goods and services acquired through 
cash transactions/ total income 
Alternatively, we might consider a household commer-
cialisation index, where: 
HCI = gross income from all market sources / total 
income 
A livelihoods perspective reminds us that, even in rural 
Africa, many households obtain half or more of their 
income from non-farm sources (Reardon 1997, Ellis 
2000)6. For policy makers, an important note of caution 
is that seeking to increase the market orientation of the 
agricultural production of households whose compara-
tive advantage lies in non-farm employment may be a 
fruitless task. 
Broadly speaking, the non-farm income of rural house-
holds may be derived from casual labour hire, wage 
employment, private business activity (self-employment) 
or remittances. There may be complementarities between 
such activities and agricultural production, for example 
where non-farm activities are conducted mainly in the 
dry season or where small land holdings are insufficient 
to absorb all of the household’s labour, but they may 
also compete (Reardon 1997). Can pursuit of these activi-
ties be considered as commercialisation? This question 
takes us beyond the scope of the current paper. However, 
we offer the following brief observations before returning 
to our main theme of agricultural commercialisation. 
First, there are important ongoing debates as to 
whether rising off-farm income shares in rural Africa 
reflect pull (opportunity) or push (survival) factors (see, 
for example, Bryceson 1999, Ellis 2000, Dorward 2003). 
Whereas, for some households, dependence on non-farm 
employment may be as much about survival as about 
comparative advantage, there are other households (e.g. 
those with above-average educational attainment, but 
limited land holding) for whom non-farm employment 
makes more sense as an income-maximising strategy 
than producing agricultural products for market.  
Second, we note that hiring out labour onto other 
farms rarely accounts for more than a small fraction of 
total off-farm income in a community or area (Reardon 
1997, Otsuka and Yamano 2006). This is generally low 
return work. However, there can be exceptions. Maertens 
and Swinnen (2007) show that employment on large-
scale export horticulture enterprises represents a “pull” 
opportunity for many rural households in the relevant 
part of Senegal. In the 1990s smallholder export horti-
culture developed in Senegal. However, in the latter part 
of that decade, the inclusion of smallholders within the 
supply chain was increasingly challenged by the private 
grades and standards introduced by importers in the 
major European markets. The industry reoriented itself 
towards estate production, while retaining a minority of 
its original smallholder outgrowers (the top producers). 
It has subsequently grown to the point where the total 
number of people employed by the industry (estate 
workers plus remaining outgrowers) far exceeds the total 
number of outgrowers contracted prior to the reorgani-
sation. Maertens and Swinnen’s (2007) analysis of house-
hold survey data divides the population of the export 
horticulture production zone into three categories: those 
who have remained as outgrowers, households with one 
or more member employed on the new export horticul-
ture estates7 and households with no direct connection 
to the industry. It shows that those who have remained 
as outgrowers are the best off. However, households with 
one or more member employed on the horticulture 
estates are significantly better off than households with 
no direct connection to the industry. Moreover, many of 
the households with one or more member employed 
on the horticulture estates would not qualify as 
outgrowers. While they have similar education levels to 
outgrowers, they have less land and fewer non-land 
assets. Because of the relatively inclusive nature of estate 
employment8, Maertens and Swinnen’s (2007) simula-
tions indicate that poverty levels in the area are lower 
under current arrangements than they would have been 
even had the contract farming form of organisation been 
able to continue. 
When we consider the competitive strengths and 
weaknesses of different modes of agricultural organisa-
tion in section 4, we might note the following lesson 
from the Senegal horticulture example. The direct 
poverty reduction potential from a particular example 
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of “commercial” agriculture is a function of the rate at 
which the enterprise can grow, its labour intensity (and 
the type of labour employed) and the returns to labour 
achieved. In general, although labour intensity varies 
considerably by crop (with horticulture among the most 
intensive labour users), smallholder agriculture uses 
labour more intensively than large-scale estates. However, 
in the Senegal example, the competitive advantages of 
the estate mode of organisation outweighed the labour 
intensity advantage of smallholder production, enabling 
more poor households to obtain higher returns through 
wage employment on estates than they could through 
own production. 
Even this, though, may only be part of the story – an 
essentially static comparison. Work on ethical trade and 
working conditions on commercial farms (see Smith et 
al., 2004; Tallontire et al., 2005; among others) emphasises 
quality of employment. It calls for a more sophisticated 
approach to poverty that recognises that enabling small-
holders to stay and work in their communities could be 
more poverty-reducing than supporting large scale 
commercial farms in a fiercely competitive global market 
place (characterised by downward pressures on prices 
and increased concentration in markets over time) that 
offers only low paid, insecure work. Returning to the 
central theme of this paper, a key issue is whether small-
holder households are forced off their land to make way 
for expanding estate production or whether sufficient 
land is available for them to co-exist with estate producers, 
hiring out some of their labour at the same time as 
pursuing their own (food and other) production 
activities. 
Third, available evidence suggests that, in Africa, 
access to non-farm income is unequally distributed, with 
better-off households acquiring a higher share of their 
income from non-farm sources than poorer households 
(Reardon 1997). In absolute terms, the differences are 
even greater. The diversity of returns from different non-
farm activities indicates the presence of barriers to entry 
into some activities, with education and access to capital 
the two most commonly cited ones. 
Our discussion about employment on commercial 
farms notwithstanding, the evidence from reviews such 
as Reardon (1997) and Otsuka and Yamano (2006) is that 
it is ultimately growth in non-farm activities within an 
economy that drives major falls in poverty. At first sight, 
this appears to call into question the importance of agri-
cultural intensification and commercialisation to growth 
processes in Africa. However, this is a premature conclu-
sion. There is some debate as to whether, in a predomi-
nantly rural economy, agricultural commercialisation is 
required to create the initial conditions for growth in 
manufacturing and service sectors. Haggblade et al. 
(2007) argue that the causality can vary by specific case 
and context. However, even where growth in manufac-
turing and service sectors responds primarily to external 
(non-agricultural) demand, Otsuka and Yamano (2006) 
argue that agricultural intensification may be necessary 
to permit households to invest in the education neces-
sary to obtain the available employment opportunities. 
Consistent with the emphasis in this report on food 
access as a constraint to commercialisation, they note 
that food insecurity may also discourage investment in 
non-farm activities: 
… according to the long-term panel studies in Asia, 
increased agricultural income, mostly generated 
from the Green Revolution, was a major source of 
funds to invest in children’s schooling in the early 
years, which later led to the choice of lucrative non-
farm occupations by children.  The last finding raises 
questions about the sources of investment in chil-
dren’s schooling in Sub-Saharan Africa.  In practice, 
many African farm households lack the financial 
resources to send their children beyond primary 
school.  The Asian experience strongly suggests that 
it is the Green Revolution that must be realized to 
initiate the structural changes towards increasing 
investment in human capital and greater participa-
tion in non-farm activities in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Indeed, without increasing crop income and 
improving food security in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
farmers will not be able to afford to send their chil-
dren to schools and allocate more time to non-farm 
activities (Otsuka and Yamano 2006, p.30, emphasis 
added).  
Processes of commercialisation 
For food production systems, Pingali and Rosegrant 
(1995) describe farmers’ level of market orientation using 
three classifications: “subsistence systems”, “semi-com-
mercial systems” and “commercial systems” (Table 1). Each 
classification has different farmer objectives, sources of 
inputs, product mix and household income sources, 
echoing our discussion above of the multiple dimensions 
of commercialisation. 
At first sight, this typology presents a rather linear 
trajectory that sees farmers, indeed agriculture sectors, 
progressing, over time, from subsistence through a state 
of semi-commercialisation to a commercial system with 
clearly defined characteristics along the four criteria – 
each one captured on a scale or hierarchy. The transition 
is described thus:
as economies grow, households shift away from 
traditional self-sufficiency goals and towards 
income and profit-oriented decision making, so 
farm output is accordingly more responsive to 
market trends. The returns to intensive subsistence 
production systems that require high levels of 
family labor generally decline relative to production 
for the market with predominant use of hired labor. 
The proportion of farm income in total household 
income declines as family members find more lucra-
tive non-agricultural employment opportunities 
(Pingali and Rosegrant, 1995, p.172–173). 
Table 1 is a simplification, but it neatly captures some 
important dynamics. One critique is that it focuses only 
on those who remain in agriculture, even if there is recog-
nition that even these households will have other income 
sources beyond agriculture. Those who exit agriculture 
altogether – either because they specialise in non-farm 
activities or migrate out of rural areas or end up largely 
as providers of wage labour to remaining farms – may 
be a minority at early stages of rural development, but 
grow to become the majority as both agricultural 
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commercialisation and broader economic development 
proceed. Moreover, as shown by Otsuka and Yamano 
(2006), once growth in non-farm employment takes off, 
this can have a more dramatic impact on poverty reduc-
tion than even agricultural growth. 
We might also observe that the path sketched out 
around Table 1 – developed principally in relation to Asia 
– applies largely to systems that start out as smallholder 
dominated. Bimodal systems (like those in Latin America 
and much of Southern and Eastern Africa) may have a 
quite different trajectory. 
Specialisation and diversification 
Table 1 above associates the agricultural commercialisa-
tion process with a move from production of a very 
diverse product mix to a more specialised production 
enterprise. Production decisions are increasingly shaped 
by market forces in conformity with comparative advan-
tage, rather than by a desire to spread risks in the context 
of highly imperfect markets. 
However, once again, progress is unlikely to be linear. 
In particular, at the earliest stages of agricultural develop-
ment, commercialisation may well be associated with 
diversification. There may be two reasons for this. The 
first is that diversification in market-oriented crop (and 
livestock) enterprises may be an important way to spread 
market-related risks, given both market imperfections 
and volatility and the lack of other mechanisms for either 
ensuring against such risks or smoothing consumption 
when they occur. Leavy (2007) on Zambia and 
Gabreselassie et al.(2007) on Ethiopia provide examples 
of households deliberately diversifying their market-
oriented crop and livestock enterprises, rather than 
expanding a single enterprise, when they accumulate 
the resources to do so. 
The second reason is that initial production of crops 
for market – especially non-food crops – represents diver-
sification away from production of basic foods for home 
consumption. Heltberg (2001:3) observes that, ‘[s]mall-
holders produce market-destined crops in addition to 
the subsistence food crops they are growing anyway’.9 
In this case, the inconclusive nature of measuring 
commercialisation in terms of degree of specialisation 
can be illustrated using a Herfindahl index. If a farmer 
starts by allocating 90 per cent of land to maize and the 
remaining 10 per cent equally to ten minor crops, the 
Herfindahl index is 0.811. If the farmer then switches to 
allocating 45 per cent each to maize (cultivated more 
intensively) and cotton, and only grows five other minor 
crops on the remaining 10 per cent, the Herfindahl index 
drops to 0.41. According to Heltberg, the degree of diver-
sification has increased. According to Pingali (Table 1), 
the farmer has moved from a “wide range” of crops 
(eleven) to being “moderately specialised” (seven), with 
almost half of cropped area now planted with the clear 
intention to produce for market. Both views of the same 
shift are defensible.  
According to Heltberg (2001:3), the tendency to add 
cash crops to existing food production activities can be 
attributed to the ‘urge for food self-sufficiency in environ-
ments of large transaction costs and high risks found in 
many sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries’. This contrasts 
with the belief of economic historians that ‘gains from 
specialisation are a key driving force in economic growth’ 
(see North 1991; cited in Heltberg 2001). Heltberg 
concludes: 
Commercialization and diversification are therefore 
associated, at least at initially low levels of commer-
cialization. This implies that smallholder agricultural 
commercialization may not yield the expected gains 
from specialisation and economies of scale, and 
that it will not, in itself, be a prime engine of agri-
cultural productivity growth. Nevertheless, 
commercialization is important as a livelihood 
strategy, source of cash income to farmers, and 
export revenue to the country, and worth promoting 
on those grounds (Heltberg 2001, p.3). 
We agree strongly with the emphasis placed here on 
“food self-sufficiency in environments of large transac-
tion costs and high risks” and that one should not expect 
specialisation to occur until food markets function much 
better than they do in most of Africa today. However, we 
caution against the conclusions drawn on the grounds 
of economies of scale. First, in section 4 we discuss the 
evidence on the competitive strengths and weaknesses 
of smallholder vs. commercial farms. There is very little 
evidence for economies of scale in agricultural produc-
tion in low wage economies, although there may well 
be economies of scale in marketing and quality assurance 
(these are both information-related). Second, the 
expected gains from smallholder agricultural commer-
cialisation may not come primarily from the realisation 
of economies of scale. Instead, they arise when house-
holds are freed from producing food for own consump-
tion, often in agro-ecological conditions that are far from 
ideal, and feel able instead to produce crops in which 
they have a clearer comparative advantage. Thus, von 
Braun and Kennedy (1994:3-4) write that: 
Subsistence production for home consumption is 
chosen by farmers because it is subjectively the 
best option, given all constraints. In a global sense, 
however, it is one of the largest enduring misalloca-
tions of human and natural resources, and, due to 
population pressure and natural resource 
constraints, it is becoming less and less viable. 
Making agricultural 
commercialisation as inclu-
sive as possible
Several studies indicate factors that the authors consider 
important in distinguishing commercialised from non-
commercialised growers and/or factors that affect 
‘farmers’ decisions to become more integrated in the 
market’ (von Braun, 1995:189). So-called “exogenous” 
determinants of commercialisation identified by these 
studies include: population change, availability of new 
technology, infrastructure, market creation, macro-eco-
nomic and trade policies. 
We do not have space to discuss all of these in detail. 
However, in this section we discuss certain critical condi-
tions that need to be in place if efforts to promote agri-
cultural commercialisation are to benefit a large 
proportion of smallholder agricultural producers. 
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Market access 
Given the centrality of participation in output markets 
in our definitions of commercialisation, market access is 
obviously crucial to commercialisation.10 Market links 
bring broader benefits to poor people in rural areas, and 
there is plenty of evidence for this (see Dercon and 
Hoddinott, 2005, among others). However, households 
have different relations to markets because of costs asso-
ciated with market transactions. The key is enabling 
farmers to access markets for their produce – as evidenced 
by the various ‘making markets work for the poor’ initia-
tives that emphasise market access as a major pathway 
out of poverty and the need to link farmers more effec-
tively to new markets (DFID, 2000; Asian Development 
Bank; Commission for Africa report, 2005; SIDA, 2003; 
World Bank World Development Report, 2000/2001, 
Chapter 10, ‘Making markets work better for poor people’; 
Almond and Hainsworth, 2005). These stress the impor-
tance of agricultural growth, but also highlight infrastruc-
ture development as necessary to improve access to new 
markets, as well as bringing other benefits to improve 
welfare overall. 
Other aspects of the current orthodoxy include better 
market information, strengthening farmer organisations 
and promoting contract farming. However, while many 
measures implemented in support of increasing market 
access have value in their own right, there are still ques-
tions around who participates. Will it still only be the top 
few per cent of farmers who respond, especially if, on 
the whole, smallholders cannot either buy their food 
reliably and cheaply from the market or intensify their 
own production? 
Successes in various initiatives that fall under the 
banners of ‘making markets work’ for poor people and 
‘linking farmers to markets’ have been mixed. Case 
studies from the DFID/ADB joint initiative focusing on 
financial, labour, and agricultural markets, and public–
private partnerships, include contract farming schemes 
and other measures to encourage value chain participa-
tion by smallholder farmers, mainly in East and South-East 
Asia.11 Contract farming schemes implemented in 
Cambodia encompass production of oranges, vegeta-
bles, rubber, tobacco and rice, with the aim to provide 
to smallholder farmers with: price information; new tech-
nologies; lower costs of entering the market; and access 
to credit. Of three schemes, two failed (CEDAC, an NGO 
supported scheme, and AADA, under a local farmer asso-
ciation) because of weak market linkages – even though 
AADA managed to increase productivity 5-fold. The third 
scheme - Angkor Kasekam Roungroeung (AKR) – is a rice 
contract farming scheme of more than 1,000 households. 
Benefits of the scheme have been to increase specialisa-
tion and the adoption of new production methods, as 
well as access to a stable market and secure income. 
Participating farmers received higher prices than in the 
market and on the whole felt that they were better off 
as a result. However, the scheme has excluded poorer 
farmers with smaller farm sizes. 
A study by Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen (2005) 
of smallholder farmers contracted to supply local super-
markets describes how smallholder farmers under micro-
production contracts, have received extensive farm 
assistance and supervision to help them meet the high 
quality standards and food safety requirements 
demanded by European supermarkets. Under the scheme 
almost 10,000 vegetable farmers in Madagascar are now 
producing for this market. Benefits of the scheme include 
higher welfare, greater income stability and shorter lean 
periods. However, local market opportunities have been 
slow in coming, not least because local supermarkets do 
not demand the same high quality and are reticent about 
contracts that emphasise higher quality standards. 
What are the characteristics of participating farmers? 
The contracting farm households tend to be considerably 
more highly educated than the average Malagasy house-
hold:  ‘The households that have contracts with the firm 
are: 64per cent of them had finished primary schools, 
and only 1 per cent of them did not do any studies at all. 
This compares to almost half of the national population 
that is analphabet’ (Minten et al., 2005:9). An area under 
contract is restricted to 0.01 hectare, but given the rela-
tively short production cycles there can be many different 
contracts on the same plot over the course of the year. 
Usually there is only one contractor per household, and 
contractors can have only one contract at a time, but 
multiple household members can have contracts concur-
rently. Households also subcontract land to people 
outside the household.  
On a much smaller scale, smallholder farmers in South 
Africa have been supplying a local SPAR supermarket, 
while SPAR supports and maintains market access. The 
initiative is underpinned by South Africa’s Agricultural 
Black Empowerment (AgriBEE) Policy, introduced in 2004. 
These smallholder farmers are classified as emerging 
farmers, and meet 30 per cent of the store’s demand for 
fresh produce, supplying cabbages, spinach and other 
vegetables. However, its reach is limited in that it amounts 
to only 27 farmers in total (Louw et al., 2006), especially 
given that there are about 3 million small-scale farmers 
in South Africa. These farmers are mainly settled in 
communal areas and farming only 14 per cent of agri-
cultural land, compared with 46,000 commercial farms, 
Level  of  M ar ket 
Orientation
Farmer’s Objective Sources of inputs Product mix Household income 
sources 
Subsistence systems Food self-sufficiency Household generated 
(non-traded)
Wide range Predominantly 
agricultural 
Semi-commercial 
systems
Surplus generation Mix of traded and 
nontraded inputs
Moderately 
specialised
Agricultural and 
non-agricultural
Commercial systems Profit maximisation Predominantly traded 
inputs
Highly specialised Predominantly 
non-agricultural
Source: Reproduced from Pingali and Rosegrant (1995) 
Table 1. Characteristics of food production systems with increasing commercialisation 
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which produce 95 per cent of marketed surplus on 86 
per cent of agricultural land (Sautier et al., 2006: 9). 
Participation of small-scale farmers in contract farming 
is still very limited. 
 An empirical analysis of the impact of a contract-
farming programme (ARB) in Senegal examines poorer 
community members’  access to contracts and the 
programme’s impact on participants’  incomes (Warning 
and Key, 2005). Contracting farmers’ incomes significantly 
increased, which not only raises the standard of living 
of growers, but the authors suggest this may also create 
positive multiplier effects for economic growth, infra-
structure and employment in the region. The study also 
finds no significant difference in wealth levels between 
contract and non-contract farmers, and therefore does 
not seem to favour “wealthy” farmers over their poorer 
neighbours. The reason put forward for this is that the 
programme focuses on producing a traditional cash crop, 
peanuts, that all farmers in the locality have grown before 
and already have the agricultural inputs to cultivate, 
rather than non-traditional crops that have limited 
markets locally. So not only is there less uncertainty 
around producing the crop, no new large capital invest-
ments are needed to participate. This creates more of a 
level playing field between larger and smaller farmers 
(Warning and Key, 2005). 
 The Porter and Phillips-Howard (1997) evaluation 
highlights how important socioeconomic context is in 
determining success or failure of contract farming 
schemes, in particular the relative balance of power 
between large companies and small-scale farmers. Citing 
work by Glover and Kusterer (1990), “ownership” by 
contracting farmers and farmer–company relations and 
communication are fundamental. A key element in 
successful schemes is effective liaison between firm and 
farmers that takes account of language needs and 
cultural understanding, including gender-related issues. 
The most successful liaison and extension is when 
companies employ people of the same ethnic back-
ground as the contracted farmers, and female extension 
officers. Representativeness of farmers’ organisations is 
another element contributing to increasing power of 
smallholder farmers under contract; where there have 
been strong local farmers’ organisations, farmers have 
successfully influenced scheme policy. Other important 
factors which help to put farmers in a stronger position 
vis à vis the contracting company, allowing them to 
negotiate more effectively and maintain independence, 
include: having alternative livelihood and income-gen-
erating activities alongside the scheme; previous experi-
ence of interacting and working with other large 
companies; land tenure; and control over water supplies 
for irrigation (Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997). 
 Contract farming can have impacts or multiplier 
effects on non-contract farmers and other actors in the 
locality, which may not always be beneficial (Singh, 2002; 
Porter & Phillips-Howard, 1995). Some studies have found 
that producing for contract can shift farm production 
towards export-oriented and cash crops. This is at the 
expense of basic food crops, potentially leading to higher 
prices. These are especially felt by those whose incomes 
have not increased as a direct result of contracting, such 
as non-contract farmers and labourers (Little & Watts, 
1994, cited in Porter & Phillips-Howard, 1995). 
 These cases illustrate that while market access initia-
tives are valuable with many benefits to participating 
farmers, in practice relatively few are able to participate 
in what, on the whole, tend to be niche markets. That 
only the top few per cent of smallholder farmers can 
actually benefit highlights the limitations of conventional 
thinking if it is decoupled from support for staples devel-
opment. This is always going to hold back their ability 
to diversify out.
Access to staple foods: food markets and/
or food production12
It is now a well-attested fact that the majority of small-
holder households in Sub-Saharan Africa are net-deficit 
in food production terms and that only a minority sell 
any food staples at all in an average year.13 Illustrating 
this for the case of Kenya, Nyoro et al. (1999) found that 
around 70 per cent of households in the high potential 
maize zone were net sellers of maize, but in none of the 
other six major agro-ecological zones in their survey did 
the proportion of net seller households exceed 30 per 
cent. Yet, almost all households grow staple foods and, 
in most cases, they devote the majority of their land area 
to them. It is thus not uncommon for studies of food-crop 
marketing to find that the top 10 per cent of producers 
account for 50 per cent or more of marketed surplus. 
Similarly, studies of cash crop systems tend to find that, 
within a given area of smallholder producers, it is the 
larger farms that engage more heavily in cash crop 
production (especially where larger farms also equate 
to higher land:labour ratios), leading to similar distribu-
tions of cash crop sales. 
This subsistence orientation persists because rural 
food markets in Africa are risky and subject to wide 
seasonal price variations. In this context small farm 
households are rational to prioritise the growing of 
subsistence food crops, even when growing other crops 
for market would yield a higher mean return in a normal 
year. In this section we develop this argument further. 
The corollary of this argument is that the expansion of 
commercial agriculture will generally have to go hand 
in hand with investments that increase the productivity 
of food staples.  
 There are two main strands of literature that investi-
gate the relationship between subsistence and commer-
cial agricultural production among smallholders. The first 
concerns the impacts of cash crop production on food 
security and nutrition. NGO and other critics of the 
promotion of cash crops have argued that cash crop 
production absorbs women’s labour and may also justify 
men taking over land previously controlled by women. 
It thereby diverts these resources from food production 
for household consumption. Meanwhile, the resulting 
income is controlled by men, who prioritise personal 
consumption (e.g. of alcohol), marrying other wives or 
investment in fixed assets, rather than providing for the 
household’s immediate food and nutritional needs.  
 A seminal work in this literature is von Braun and 
Kennedy (1994). Summarising across their case studies, 
they found that households that invest in cash crops 
rarely sacrifice food security to do so. Specifically: 
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Farms adopting new “commercial” crops or technolo- •
gies often devote a considerably smaller share of their 
land to food crops for own consumption than do non-
adopters. In absolute terms, the area that they devote 
to food crops for own consumption may also be 
smaller. However, they generally achieve higher yields 
in  their  food  crop production. As  a  result,  per  capita 
production  of  food  for  own  consumption was  as 
often higher for adopters than for non-adopters as 
vice versa.
Higher  incomes  as  a  result  of  adoption  of  new  •
“commercial”  crops  or  technologies generally lead 
to higher calorie intake, although the increase is less 
than proportional due  to  increased  non-food  expen-
diture  shares  and  a  preference  for more  expensive 
calories (good for other aspects of nutrition).  ‘Any 
negative  tendencies  to spend  less for  food  because 
of  loss  of  income  control  by  women  or  because 
of  increased involvement  in  market  (cash)  transac-
tions  are  generally  small  and  are  more  than compen-
sated for by increased incomes due to commercialization’ 
(p78). 
There  is  ‘no  evidence  for  an  adverse  effect  on  child  •
nutrition  from  increased commercialisation, even 
when income is held constant’ (p46). Equally, though, 
child health  indicators  rarely  improved,  despite 
higher  incomes,  as  (aside  from  food) additional 
incomes  were  rarely  spent  on  items  with  short-run 
health  benefits.  The authors  argued  that  increased 
incomes  should  be  combined  with  public  action 
to deliver improved health outcomes. 
 While this first strand of literature examines the impact 
of commercial agricultural production on the food secu-
rity of those who have already engaged in it, the second 
considers whether household concerns about food secu-
rity act as a constraint to adoption of commercial agri-
culture. Specifically, if food markets are unreliable, 
inefficient or highly volatile, it is argued that farm house-
holds will prioritise feeding themselves and hence will 
only cultivate very small quantities of crops intended for 
sale if they expect to experience a food deficit (Fafchamps, 
1992; Jayne, 1994). Thus, under production conditions 
better suited to oil crops than to grains, Jayne (1994) 
found that, ‘Controlling for differences in household 
assets and location, grain-surplus households in five 
semi-arid regions of Zimbabwe were found to cultivate 
48% more oilseed crops for the market than their grain-
deficit neighbours’ (p388). 
 Some evidence for this food-security-as-constraint-
to-commercialisation view is also found in the studies 
reported by von Braun and Kennedy (1994). Thus, while 
several of the authors in that volume calculated that 
returns to land and/or labour were significantly higher 
under cash cropping than under food production for 
own consumption, adopting households generally 
devoted only 40 per cent or less of their land to the new 
“commercial” crops or technologies, which was less than 
they continued to devote to subsistence food crops. 
Meanwhile, the smallest farms in the study areas were 
under-represented in cash crop schemes for various 
reasons, including both administrative selection (where 
this occurred) and their own choice.  
The case study by Peters and Herrera (1994) neatly 
summarises why smallholders in Malawi plant on average 
around 80 per cent of their land to maize. Prices of 
purchased maize are both high and unpredictable in the 
annual “deficit period” (December-January). However, in 
addition to this there are strong taste preferences for 
local maize varieties pounded in a traditional way and 
there are cultural reasons as to why cash resources within 
the household tend to get exhausted more readily than 
retained food stocks, hence making the latter more reli-
able as a food security reserve.  
The Mozambique study by Heltberg and Tarp (2002) 
also highlights the importance of staple food production 
to agricultural commercialisation. Thus, in their regres-
sions to explain the extent of participation in agricultural 
output markets, the single most important variable was 
the mean level of maize yield achieved in the district 
concerned. This could indicate that maize was readily 
available for purchase in the districts concerned or that 
individual households in such districts were able to 
devote land and labour to crops other than staple foods 
because they were also able to ensure a reasonable 
supply of food through own production.   
Of course, the two aspects of the relationship between 
cash crop production and subsistence food production 
are not mutually inconsistent. Indeed, if adoption of a 
cash crop only occurs when concerns related to food 
security can be allayed, then non-negative outcomes of 
cash crop production on food security are likely to be 
observed. 
 More recently, Pandey et al. (2006) have carefully 
investigated the role of upland rice in the farming systems 
of the northern uplands of Vietnam. Yields of upland rice 
are lower than for lowland rice, so households that have 
both upland and lowland plots tend to plant less upland 
rice in their upland plots14, which are better suited to 
higher value cash crops (tree or horticultural crops) or 
even maize (a cash crop in this context). In more acces-
sible areas, households can also readily obtain rice 
through the market from nearby lowland areas, so also 
produce less upland rice. However, in more remote areas, 
households cannot rely on obtaining reasonably priced 
rice through the market and hence plant a much higher 
proportion of their plots to upland rice. Within the subset 
(210 households) of their household survey dataset that 
did not have lowland rice plots, Pandey et al. (2006) show 
that higher upland rice yields are associated with a lower 
proportion of total area planted to upland rice and a 
higher proportion planted to cash crops. In a similar vein, 
Poulton and Ndufa (2005) found that, within three subdi-
visions of Siaya and Vihiga districts in western Kenya, 
households that achieved higher maize yields in the long 
rains season had more diversified cropping patterns 
(away from maize) in the short rains season, controlling 
for farm size. 
Pandey et al. (2006) argue that, 
Rice productivity improvement can thus be an 
important strategy for escaping from poverty while 
assuring food security. Improvements in household 
food security can thus facilitate and reinforce the 
process of commercialization rather than negating 
this process, as is believed in some policy circles. 
[Contrary to these same beliefs] ... a more gradual 
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approach that is based on enhancing food security 
first before launching a major commercialization 
progam for uplands is likely to be more successful 
in bringing about the desired change (von Braun 
and Kennedy 1994). Examples abound where 
commercialization programs that did not give due 
consideration to food security have performed 
poorly in the uplands of Vietnam and elsewhere 
(p77). 
 In the context of Vietnam, intensification of staple 
food production for home consumption may be a prereq-
uisite for diversification into commercial agriculture 
principally in less accessible areas that cannot rely on 
food purchase from the market.  However, basic infra-
structure and transport is better in much of Vietnam than 
in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, while local food markets 
are also generally better developed (assisted by greater 
population density and the fact that the nation as a whole 
has a rice surplus). In sub-Saharan Africa, intensification 
of staple food production for home consumption may 
be a prerequisite for widespread diversification into 
commercial agriculture in many areas – not just the more 
“remote” ones. 
We note, however, that policies to promote staple 
intensification among food deficit households with small-
medium land holdings, as a means to eventual diversi-
fication into production of other crops for market, are 
likely to be different from policies to (further) expand 
staples production among existing surplus producers. 
Thus, policies that raise the price of food staples should 
provide incentives for the latter to further expand their 
production, but will only worsen the trap that the former 
find themselves in, reducing the already scarce cash that 
they have to buy improved seeds or fertiliser. In areas of 
average or higher agro-ecological potential, but poor 
market development, a system of input vouchers for 
staples production might assist diversification into higher 
value crops, if accompanied by other interventions to 
simultaneously promote such alternative crops15. 
However, in semi-arid areas significant staples intensifica-
tion may always be too risky for producers to contem-
plate. In such cases, widespread commercialisation of 
agriculture might only come with improved market 
access, allowing both purchases of staples and oppor-
tunities to sell crops more suited to local growing condi-
tions. The Machakos area in Kenya may be illustrative 
here (Tiffen et al. 1994). We note at least two effects of 
small land sizes on agricultural commercialisation. First, 
in the absence of efficient food markets, households with 
smaller land sizes have to be assisted to achieve higher 
staple yields before they will begin to devote land to 
production of higher value crops for market17. Second, 
lower land per capita means that they will able to benefit 
less (in absolute terms) from their commercialisation 
efforts. 
 
Asset accumulation 
Intuitively, differences in asset holdings are likely to be 
a big determinant of who responds to incentives to 
commercialise. This is confirmed by empirical evidence, 
such as Heltberg’s 2001 study of smallholder farmers in 
Mozambique, which identifies capital accumulation as 
an important stimulus to commercialisation. In this 
section we discuss the key assets for rural households: 
land, plus livestock and equipment. 
Land 
Jayne et al. (2003) present evidence from five countries 
of southern and eastern Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Rwanda and Zambia) of land-holding 
patterns among smallholder households in the 1990s, 
based on nationally representative rural household 
surveys. Average land holding sizes per household have 
fallen by one third to one half since the 1960s, as popula-
tions have risen (see also Ellis, 2005). Contrary to some 
stylised facts about the relatively egalitarian nature of 
land distribution within communal tenure systems, Jayne 
et al. (2003) also demonstrate that there is considerable 
inequality within land holdings – at least as great as in 
Asia at the onset of the Green Revolution. Only about a 
third of this inequality can be explained by inter-village 
effects (for example, differences in agro-ecological poten-
tial and local population densities); the remainder is 
within-village inequality. Observable household vari-
ables, such as demographic structure and livestock 
holding (see below) explain a further 12–20 per cent of 
total observed variation. Jayne et al. (2003, p267) suggest 
that ‘institutional and governance factors operating 
within local systems for allocating land’ may account for 
some of the remaining inequality. Thus, for example, the 
first clans and families to settle an area commonly receive 
larger land allocations than later arrivals, while other 
studies indicate that those related to the Chief respon-
sible for land allocation receive larger allocations than 
those without such links.
Jayne et al. (2003) show that around 25 per cent of 
households in all five surveyed countries have access to 
less than 0.1 ha of land per capita – near landless. They 
also show that income per capita rises sharply as land 
holding rises from this level to 0.25 ha per capita (and 
more gradually thereafter). In other words, whereas 
households with lower land per capita obtain a higher 
share of their income from non-farm sources than house-
holds with a greater land endowment16, this is insufficient 
to compensate for lower land holdings in a predomi-
nantly agricultural economy.
Jayne et al. (2003, p254) comment that ‘the poor gener-
ally lack the land, capital and education to respond 
quickly to agricultural market opportunities and tech-
nical innovation’. Thinking specifically about land, we 
argue that small land holdings interact unhelpfully with 
poorly developed food markets to keep poor households 
focused on the production of (often low value) staple 
food crops. Thus, at any given yield level, a household 
with lower land per capita has to devote a higher propor-
tion of its land to food production if it is to achieve a 
given level of self-sufficiency. There is then less land avail-
able, if any at all, for production of higher value crops for 
market. 
These points are illustrated by Table 2, which is derived 
from action research carried out in Siaya and Vihiga 
districts of western Kenya in 2001–2005. Land holding 
sizes in these districts are tiny, such that in a 2005 survey 
the 75th percentile household only had access to around 
0.6ha, albeit land that could be farmed in two seasons 
per year. (This works out at 0.18ha per capita – below 
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the threshold of 0.25ha per capita highlighted by Jayne 
et al. 2003). Table 2 considers possible outcomes from 
agricultural intensification efforts that permitted an 
intensification of maize production in the long rains 
season, so as to permit diversification into other crops 
in the short rains. In the project in question, intensifica-
tion of maize production was being promoted through 
provision of technical advice plus a credit scheme that 
assisted households to acquire improved maize seed and 
inorganic fertiliser. Production of soybean was being 
promoted for cash, food and soil fertility benefits, while 
planting fast growing “improved fallow” tree species on 
small parcels of land helps restore soil fertility as well as 
producing firewood, poles or fodder. Kales provide addi-
tional cash income. In the “best case” scenarios shown 
in Table 2, maize and bean yields for the 75th percentile 
farm are double those recorded by the actual 2005 
project survey. 
According to Table 2, the 75th percentile farm house-
hold could satisfy all its maize requirements at these 
enhanced yields (per capita consumption requirement 
is about 140kg per person p.a.) and devote 80 per cent 
of its land area to crops other than maize during the 
short rains season. However, its income per capita from 
farming activities alone would still only be around half 
of the international poverty line of US$1 (PPP terms), 
meaning that it would require non-farm activities to take 
it out of poverty. Meanwhile, with lower expected yields, 
as very poor households are rarely early adopters of new 
technological packages, the 25th percentile farm house-
hold would not satisfy its maize requirements, so would 
be likely to continue devoting most or all of its land to 
maize and beans for home consumption.
Jayne et al. (2003) acknowledge that there are few 
easy solutions to the problem of limited land access for 
many African smallholder households. In both Malawi 
and Ethiopia, land redistribution programmes to enforce 
a floor level of land holding per farm household are peri-
odically floated in policy dialogues. Less radical would 
be efforts to stimulate land rental markets within 
customary tenure systems (see Crookes and Lyne, 2003, 
for an example from KwaZulu-Natal) or investment in 
irrigation. What is clear is that efforts to stimulate inten-
sification and commercialisation among farm households 
with small landholdings will require significant coordina-
tion across several services and markets: provision of 
technical advice; supply of both improved maize seed 
and alternative high value crops; supply of fertiliser and 
a mechanism for making it affordable to poor households 
(either credit or subsidy), and some form of linkage to a 
market for higher value produce. This may be achieved 
in a project setting, but is a formidable challenge for 
regular development administrations (see section 5). 
Moreover, the continued absence of a replicable seasonal 
credit model for small-scale, semi-subsistence farm 
households in Africa suggests that intensification and 
commercialisation among farm households with small 
landholdings might only be feasible where the state is 
willing to invest in a fertiliser subsidy as a way of over-
coming the affordability constraint. 
 Even then Table 2 suggests that efforts to promote 
commercialisation should focus on reaching households 
with middling land holdings18, on the assumption that 
better endowed households are likely to adopt promising 
technological packages fairly readily. According to Jayne 
et al. (2003), the long-term hope for poorer households 
with tiny land holdings is that eventually agricultural 
growth will stimulate growth in non-farm employment 
opportunities. 
Until then, such households may best be assisted 
through some form of social protection intervention (e.g. 
public works programmes, cash transfers, possibly also 
including fertiliser subsidies as social protection). 
Animal traction 
Another asset that greatly assists smallholder households 
to respond to market opportunities is animal traction 
(livestock plus the relevant equipment). Animal traction 
Table 2. “Best case” agricultural incomes for representative farm households in western Kenya 
75th percentile farm 25th percentile farm
Cropping pattern (ha) Long Rains Short Rains Long Rains Short Rains
Maize/beans (intercrop) 0.42 0.12 0.2 0.2
Soybean 0.06 0.24
Kales 0.12 0.12
Improved fallow 0.12
Total (ha) 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.2
Assumed yields (t/ha)
Maize (intercrop) 3.0 1.5 1.37 0.7
Beans (intercrop) 0.6 0.4 0.29 0.2
Soybean 1.5 1.5
Kales 5.0 5.0
Family size 6.5 4.0 
Maize production per person/ year 222kg 104kg
Net Income per person/ day
Kshs 16.63 3.78
US$ PPP (current) 0.47 0.10
Source: adapted from Poulton and Ndufa (2005
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allows farmers to respond quickly to rains, thereby 
increasing yields, and to cultivate more land (assuming 
that they have access to it19). In addition, livestock owner-
ship can provide manure for soil fertility, to the benefit 
either of staples intensification or of cash crop produc-
tivity. West African cotton sectors provide an excellent 
example of a virtuous circle of cash crop production and 
animal traction investment, with profits from cotton 
being reinvested in animal traction to the benefit of both 
food production and cash crop productivity (Savadogo 
et al. 1998). Historically, cotton sector policy in West Africa 
has promoted animal traction adoption, with the result 
that 30–40 per cent of farm households are considered 
fully equipped for animal traction use (weeding as well 
as planting). By contrast, in southern and eastern African 
cotton sectors, fewer households are equipped even to 
plough with their own equipment. “Top end” producers 
in the different regions achieve similar yields, but the 
much greater proportion of fully equipped producers in 
West African cotton sectors goes a long way towards 
explaining the much higher average yields achieved by 
these sectors as compared with southern and eastern 
Africa. 
 
Which crops and markets?
It is clear that - contrary to the fears described in 
Section 2 that commercialisation means large scale, 
export-oriented farming, and essentially changes that 
favour larger, more powerful players to the detriment 
of smallholder farmers - commercialisation as 
measured by something like the CCI could be relevant 
for any size of farm and any market. What is important 
is that farmers benefit from participating wherever 
the opportunities are and will respond to any market 
opportunities that are available. This does not mean 
exclusively export markets. Indeed, staples markets 
in SSA are estimated to be worth US$50 billion per 
annum and growing at 4 per cent per annum (Diao et 
al. 2003)20. Further, in reality large-scale and smallholder 
farming have different strengths, which give each of 
them advantages in producing certain crops.  
 
Competitive strengths and weaknesses of 
different farm types 
Often, different modes of agricultural production exist 
side-by-side and interact with each other.21
These include: 
Small-scale farmers:  •
Small-scale “non-commercial” farmers – might sell •	
some produce but do not or cannot make their entire 
living from farming (Type A); 
Small-scale commercial farmers – tend always to have •	
been market-oriented and make a living from selling 
their output (Type B); 
Small-investor farmers – farming entirely for the  •
market, albeit on a modest scale and often as a 
secondary activity; 
Large-scale “business” farming. •
 A long-standing literature (see, for example, 
Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986) observes that 
different farm types have different advantages and disad-
vantages when it comes to production and marketing. 
Some of these are summarised in Table 3. 
 Crudely speaking, the competitive advantages of 
smallholder farms are centred on their low-cost supply 
of (generally) highly motivated family labour, whereas 
large-scale farms face lower costs in most other input 
and output market transactions.  
Small-investor farmers are also sometimes labelled 
“emerging” commercial farmers. The term “emerging”, 
however, implies that they have risen from the ranks of 
smallholder producers, which is often not the case. Such 
farmers are still relatively rare in most of Africa, although 
we would expect their numbers to increase as processes 
of commercialisation continue (see section 2.2)22. Work 
under the Future Agricultures Consortium by Amdissa 
Teshome, exploring young peoples’ aspirations in relation 
to the agriculture sector, suggest that this is the type of 
farming that many young rural people, the sons and 
daughters of farmers themselves, would hope to under-
take in the future.  
Table 4 takes the analysis in Table 3 one stage further 
and assesses the likely competitiveness of different farm 
types in different crops and markets, given the technical 
and economic requirements of different crops and the 
demands made by different markets. This is an area where 
the predictions of theory and actual experience of 
commercial competitiveness tally quite closely.  
Better-endowed smallholders continue to feature 
prominently as suppliers of staples, horticultural prod-
ucts and a variety of other crops for domestic and regional 
markets, where quality requirements are modest and 
Smallholder 
farmers 
Small 
Investor-
farmers
Large-
scale 
farming Type 
‘A’
Type 
‘B’
Land * ** ** **
Finance / Credit * ** *** 
Inputs: access/ 
purchase
* * ** *** 
Skilled labour: 
access
* ** *** 
Unskilled 
labour: motiva-
tion, supervision
*** *** ** * 
Contacts/
networks
* ** ** *** 
Market 
knowledge 
* ** *** *** 
Technical 
knowledge
* ** *** *** 
Product 
traceability and 
quality 
assurance
* *** 
Risk 
management
* * ** ***
* = poorly positioned (no star is worse!); *** = well-
positioned
Table 3. Competitive strengths and weaknesses 
of different farm types
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safety and traceability are yet to become major issues. 
Whilst we have focused on crops within this paper, a 
similar assessment could also be made for dairy products. 
They also maintain a strong position in a number of tradi-
tional export commodity chains characterised by highly 
labour-intensive production, harvesting or post-harvest 
processes. However, they have struggled to remain within 
many export horticulture chains, even where they have 
initially featured strongly, due to increasing demands 
for quality (especially where this is linked to new capital 
investments), safety and traceability over time (Boselie 
et al. 2003, Maertens and Swinnen 2007). 
Large-scale producers continue to expand as horti-
cultural exporters (see, for example, Maertens and 
Swinnen 2007), but have made fewer inroads into 
domestic markets where high-value segments are often 
still small.23 Africa as a whole records almost no success 
in low value export commodities where economies of 
scale in handling and efficient logistics are critical for 
international competitiveness, given low margins. 
Cassava in Nigeria may be on the threshold of export 
competitiveness (Nweke 2004). In general, though, one 
would expect smallholders to be at a competitive disad-
vantage compared with larger farms in supplying low 
value export commodities, due to the higher costs of 
bulking up supplies from numerous small-scale 
producers. 
One implication of this sort of analysis is that the domi-
nant type of farm observed during agricultural commer-
cialisation will depend at least in part on the types of 
crops being promoted (which is, in turn, a function of 
agro-ecological conditions and market opportunities) 
as well as the markets being targeted. Large-scale farms 
might flourish because they are the most appropriate 
mode of commercialised agriculture for particular crops 
and markets in which the country or region has compara-
tive advantage – not necessarily because there is a large 
farm bias in policy. Equally, a country or region may do 
well in two product groups (say, coffee and export horti-
culture in Ethiopia), with smallholder production systems 
dominating in one and large farms dominating in the 
other. 
Policy discourse versus 
implementation 
However, there may also be other reasons why large 
farms are seen to do better than smallholder farmers. 
Given the diversity of policies at the national level care 
should be taken when making generalisations. It is neces-
sary, however, to consider how policy narratives, with 
their in-built assumptions about the way things work, 
actually translate in implementation. 
At the national level, Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) are one component of an array of policy 
instruments and strategies for poverty alleviation and 
economic development. Our reading of various PRSP 
documents (Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, among others) tells 
us that they do not focus, either explicitly or implicitly, 
on large-scale/ estate export-led agriculture to the exclu-
sion of small-scale farmers. Most PRSPs see the commer-
cialisation of smallholder agriculture as a key pillar of 
rural development. It is fair to say, however, that most 
current government policy, backed by donors, appears 
to promote an essentially dualistic agricultural system, 
through supporting large commercial farms on one side 
and the ‘small farm sector’ on the other.  
However, how policy objectives translate into policy 
actions is important. In practice what is observed is typi-
cally a mix of interventions to assist both large–scale and 
smallholder farm enterprises. Unfortunately, the general 
picture over the past decade or more has been one of 
declining support to agriculture in Africa. Recent reviews 
of the rural focus of PRSPs and PRSCs (Poverty Reduction 
Support Credits) have found the seeming neglect of rural 
issues in PRSPs to be ‘not so much the lack of policies 
targeting the rural productive sectors but rather the 
nature and reach of those policies’ (Cromwell et al., 
2005:3)25. Such neglect hits smallholders hardest. 
 
A level playing field?
Why might large farm bias be apparent in practice even 
though policy appears to be pro-smallholder on paper? 
Implementation of policies can produce different 
outcomes to those stated or intended for various reasons, 
including: 
Individual  officials  or  politicians  do  not  believe  the  •
pro-smallholder  rhetoric  of policies. (This may be true, 
but it is difficult to produce evidence to substantiate 
such a claim). 
Smallholder 
farmers 
Small 
Investor-
farmers
Large-
scale 
farming Type 
‘A’
Type ‘B’
Food 
staples 
(local/
national/
regional 
markets) 
  ?
High value 
crops, e.g. 
horticulture 
(local/
national/
regional 
markets)
  ? 
Low value 
export 
commodi-
ties, 
e.g. cassava, 
soya, grains 
?
Horticulture 
exports 
? ?  
Traditional 
export 
commodi-
ties
coffee, 
cotton, 
cocoa, 
tea, 
ground-
nuts
 sugar, 
tea, 
tobacco
Table 4. Predicting competitiveness of farm 
types in different crops and markets24
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Implementation may  reflect  the personal or collective  •
priorities of elites,  rather  than the priorities set out in 
national poverty reduction or agriculture sector strate-
gies (see Chirwa et al., 2006 on Malawi).26
Smallholder farms need a higher level of support if  •
they are to prosper than do large-scale farms. 
This latter point is a critical one in the light of policy 
reforms that have occurred over the past two decades 
in African economies. Large-scale farms can prosper 
when a basic enabling environment is in place. By 
contrast, smallholders tend to require pro-active service 
provision. 
An enabling environment for the agriculture sector, 
most of it centrally provided, includes: 
macro-economic stability and favourable real exchange  •
rates;
a sound banking sector, which is not just city- •
focused; 
core  infrastructure  (especially  trunk  roads,  ports,  •
availability  of  electricity  and telecommunications in 
rural areas); 
security of land tenure;  •
political support of private enterprise.  •
Getting these right might be enough for large-scale 
agriculture and/or agribusiness development, as large-
scale enterprises are able to source critical production 
and marketing services themselves.27 They may even be 
able to draw upon the results of international research 
and development (seed varieties and another technolo-
gies developed elsewhere) in the absence of an active 
national research and extension system. Large-scale 
agriculture and/or agribusiness development might in 
turn facilitate some smallholder involvement and devel-
opment (see discussion of contract farming in section 
3.1). However, broad-based smallholder commercialisa-
tion will require much more active state engagement in 
service provision. 
Smallholders need to be provided with a range of pre- 
and post-harvest services.28 These include: 
finance schemes;   •
extension advice;  •
input markets/systems;  •
market information and linkages.  •
As argued earlier, even if the objective is production 
of crops for market, service support may have to be 
provided to enhance the efficiency of staples production 
before this objective can be reached by the majority of 
smallholders. 
Few of the required services will be entirely private 
sector-driven under current conditions in Africa, though 
some may be assisted by capacity building for farmer 
organisations. There nearly always has to be some state 
role – if not in service provision, then in its 
regulation.29
The upshot of all this is that, where state capacity is 
lacking, large-scale farms may still perform well, along 
with smallholder production of a few key export 
commodities, while the majority of smallholder systems 
languish. This is different from a pro-large scale bias, but 
the outcomes may not look that different. 
 
The institutional environment for pro-
smallholder policies 
Two important observations flow from the arguments 
of the previous section. The first is that, except in very 
small and agro-ecologically homogeneous states, 
effective decentralisation is important for broad-based 
smallholder commercialisation. The pre- and post-
harvest services required by smallholders producing 
food staples for own consumption and crops for 
domestic and regional markets are best organised at 
decentralised (for example, district or regional) level 
(Foster et al. 2001, Poulton et al. 2006a). Agribusiness 
is unlikely to invest in coordinated service provision 
for these crops through contract farming schemes and 
it is at local level that the coordination across multiple, 
independent providers of complementary services is 
most feasible. 
The second is that large-scale farms may be able to 
prosper even with an ineffective or non-performing 
Ministry of Agriculture, but smallholders need the 
services that the Ministry of Agriculture is supposed to 
be responsible for. A quick review of the key elements 
of an enabling environment for agriculture shows that 
all, with the possible exception of land-tenure security, 
fall under the remit of central economic ministries such 
as Finance and Planning. A now-common observation 
is that the Ministry of Finance handles more policy rele-
vant to agriculture than the Ministry of Agriculture (Foster 
et al. 2001, Cabral and Scoones, 2006). However, this is 
at best only partially true. For, if the Ministry of Agriculture 
is not actively committed to ensuring that services are 
provided to smallholders, then the likelihood is they will 
not be provided (with the partial exception of contract 
farming schemes noted above). The result will be stagna-
tion and continuing poverty on the majority of a country’s 
(smallholder) farms.  
Historically, Ministries of Agriculture have seen their 
role to be that of providing services – which have rarely 
reached more than a tiny minority of largely privileged, 
well-connected farmers. Instead, their role should be to 
support decentralised service provision and local coor-
dination mechanisms (effectively, providing a technical 
input into processes that are actually focused on local 
government). 
This points to reorienting Ministries of Agriculture, 
specifically to maintain strong state capacity but also, as 
a recent Future Agricultures paper on policy narratives 
in African agriculture suggests, to ‘refocus attention on 
key roles – including investment in state-led reforms to 
help create the structural conditions for kick-starting the 
agricultural economy’ (Cabral and Scoones, 2006, p32). 
This means on-going investment in coordination and 
intermediation functions. Of course, such a shift to 
substantial state function for ministries is not trivial. A 
change in agricultural governance setting, against many 
vested interests, is certain to be challenging in terms of 
organisation and capacity, not to mention politically. But 
if we want to see agricultural commercialisation policy 
that reflects and promotes pathways that are truly pro-
poor, pro-smallholder and pro-development, govern-
ments and donors need to move beyond rhetoric to 
actually recognising and supporting channels and envi-
ronments through which smallholder farmers can and 
do participate.
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End Notes
† Institute  of  Development  Studies,  Brighton; 
# School  of  Oriental  and  African  Studies  (SOAS), 
University of London.
1 For work on multipliers and growth linkages see 
Delgado et al. (1998). 
2 See also: Pretty et al. (1996) on sustainable 
agriculture’s links to food security and strengthening 
rural economies; Swaminathan (1995); IDS work on 
labour exchange in Northern Province, Zambia (White 
et al., 2005). The Commission for Africa report (2005) 
also cites family farms as the primary source of jobs in 
Africa, commercialisation of family-farms has important 
multiplier and employment creation effects going 
beyond the farm itself. For example, increasing 
employment in formal and informal trade can have 
far-reaching poverty-reduction effects, for instance in 
Benin, where poor rural women make up 90 per cent of 
informal traders.  
3 Livestock, aquaculture and other forms of agriculture 
are not within the scope of this paper, although the 
arguments presented here are equally valid for these 
and other subsectors. 
4 See Sharp et al. (2007).
5 For example, Pingali (1997) and von Braun (1995), 
among others.
6 We are interested here in all activities other than 
agricultural production undertaken by the household 
on its own account. These include both casual labour 
hire on the farms of others (“off-farm”, but not “non-
farm”) and small business activity such as processing or 
handicraft making (“non-farm”) that is conducted on 
the household’s own property.    
7 In the light of discussions elsewhere in this paper, 
however, it is worth noting that, while estate farm 
workers derive more than one third of their income 
from agricultural wages, own-farm agriculture is the 
main source of income in the area. On average across 
the sample, two thirds of household income is derived 
from own farming.
8 Migrant families are, however, under-represented as 
estate employees.
9  See also Omamo 1998 (a) and (b).
10 For example, Heltberg’s study of smallholder farmers 
in Mozambique finds ‘to stimulate commercialisation 
the most important factors appear to be improved 
access to markets and information, risk reduction, 
capital accumulation’ (Heltberg, 2001). 
11 For more information see: Cambodia:http://www.dfid.
gov.uk/pubs/files/mmw4p/agcambodia.pdf.; Vietnam: 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/mmw4p/agvietnam.
pdf.
12 This section draws on an as-yet-unpublished 
‘All-Africa Review of Experience with Commercial 
Agriculture’, undertaken by Poulton and colleagues for 
the World Bank during 2006-07. 
13 One of the first articles in the literature establishing 
this was Weber et al. (1988).
14  However, some upland rice is typically still planted, 
as it is harvested before lowland rice and is available in 
time for consumption during the main lean period 
(September–November).
15 The challenge of providing a coordinated package of 
support measures to both promote staples 
intensification and simultaneously assist diversification 
should not be underestimated, however.
16 Jayne et al. (2003) also examine the relationship 
between share of non-farm income and total income 
per capita and find that this is positive in all countries 
except Ethiopia – a finding that is broadly consistent 
with that of Reardon (1997). 
17 Note that higher yields for staples also raise the 
returns to their production, which may discourage 
diversification into other crops.
18 The figures cited by Jayne et al. (2003) show mean 
land holdings among smallholder households ranging 
from 0.16ha per capita in Rwanda to around 0.6ha per 
capita in Zambia. 
19 Jayne et al. (2003) found that landholdings both per 
household and per capita were strongly associated with 
livestock ownership. The causality could work both 
ways here. 
20 In a study of maize pricing and policy in Kenya, Jayne 
et al.(2001) also state the case for diversified crop 
production: „productivity growth in agriculture is likely 
to be a precondition for injecting purchasing power 
into rural areas and hence stimulating demand and 
employment growth in the broader economy. But this 
will require viewing agricultural income growth as 
deriving from many crops. Important regional 
differences suggest that tailoring policies with their 
regionally dis-aggregated impacts in mind can lead to 
improved outcomes’ (2001: 25). 
21 See for example, White et al. (2006) on Zambia, 
Cromwell et al. (2005) on Malawi; Sharp et al.’s (2007) 
Future Agricultures work on Ethiopia.
22 See work on ‘New actors in rural land markets’ 
Ouedraogo (2006); Toure and Seck (2005). 
23 In Zimbabwe prior to 2001, large-scale farms 
dominated supplies of fruit and vegetables to domestic 
markets – both “top end” supermarkets and hotels 
(through specialist wholesalers) and traditional 
wholesale markets, such as Mbare. However, the land 
allocation in Zimbabwe at that time meant that 
large-scale farms enjoyed not just better land than the 
majority of smallholders, but also better access to the 
major urban centres (important for perishable 
products). By contrast, in Kenya, smallholders producers 
dominate supplies of fresh produce to traditional 
wholesale markets, whilst a cohort of small investor 
farmers has grown up to supply supermarkets, which 
still only account for around 5 per cent of urban fresh 
produce sales (Neven and Reardon 2004). Large-scale 
enterprises have so far focused on export 
opportunities, perhaps because supermarket supply 
chains are insufficiently consolidated to constitute 
sizeable market opportunities.
24 Some of the insights underlying this table were 
derived from an as-yet-unpublished ‘All-Africa Review 
of Experience with Commercial Agriculture’, undertaken 
by Poulton and colleagues for the World Bank during 
2006-07.
25 The study, which examines three PRSPs: Malawi, 
Nicaragua and Vietnam, also notes the seeming lack of 
hard evidence of what actually has been or is being 
implemented (page 26). See also Shepherd and Fritz 
(2005) and World Bank (2005) A Review of Rural 
Development Aspects of PRSPs and PRSCs, 2000-2004. 
26  Taking Malawi as an example, there is a tendency 
towards seeing the agricultural sector as principally 
dualistic in nature with the estate sector on the one 
hand, and small farms on the other. Small farms are 
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further subdivided by type into: commercial small 
farms (about 10 per cent of small farms); small farmers 
with commercial development potential (about 50 per 
cent), and severely resource constrained small farmers 
(about 40 per cent).  For this bottom cadre of small 
farms the policy focus is on social safety nets, with little 
indication of how this links to broader economic 
growth efforts (Cromwell et al., 2005).
27 The cost of sourcing such services is, of course, 
important for competitiveness and may constrain even 
large scale agricultural and agribusiness development. 
28 Note that technical requirements vary by crop. Hence, 
roots and tubers generally require fewer purchased 
inputs for their production than cereals, and hence 
make fewer demands on seasonal finance. Where they 
exhibit less seasonality in production, as in the case of 
cassava, issues of price stabilisation are also less 
pressing. (In any case, prolonged storage of roots and 
tubers is infeasible). Production of such crops may thus 
do well even where there are no systems for 
coordinated service provision to smallholder producers. 
We also note the rather better agricultural performance 
in West Africa, as compared to southern and eastern 
Africa, over the past two decades. This is worthy of 
further systematic analysis, to distinguish the effects of 
different crop mixes, conditions more or less conducive 
to high-quality service-provision and other factors. 
29 Within contract farming schemes, several of the key 
services may be provided by agribusiness, although 
these would not usually include capacity-building for 
independent farmers’ organisations or the support for 
asset accumulation or staples intensification that were 
highlighted above. Unfortunately, contract farming 
itself is not appropriate for all crops – for example, 
those for which independent local markets exist. 
Moreover, even contract farming requires some form of 
regulatory framework, for example to manage the 
problem of side-selling where loans are advanced to 
contract farmers.
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